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right: I've never tasted chocolate like that before, or since. Should I refrain from doing so?
Well, no, of course not. That chocolate?that is, the act of eating it? wasn't really evil, after all. It was very pleasurable and, we can reasonably suppose, innocently so. And even if it's not true that I have a moral duty to?should?engage in pleasurable acts, what is strictly true is that I don't have a moral duty not to do so. Provided that my doing so is indeed innocent, provided that it isn't undertaken at the cost of foregoing acts that I do have duties to perform, it seems perfectly okay. Pleasurable acts that respect that proviso are a subset of the set of acts that are neither obliga tory nor forbidden. So why was she at least half-right in describing the act of eating that chocolate as "evil"?
Before we can get near to answering this question, a fair bit of ground-clearing needs to be done. Probably most philosophers would agree that?even leaving aside great chocolate experiences?we use the word 'evil' very unstintingly, perhaps too unstintingly. For one thing, it's used to describe not only acts, but also persons, dispositions and states of affairs. Moreover, on many conceptions of evil, some of these kinds of uses lack independence from the others: some are derivative from, or pre suppose, one or another of the others. Thus evil acts, it's sometimes suggested, are necessarily the products of evil dispositions; or the evilness of states of affairs is a sufficient condition of the evilness of the acts that bring them about; or having evil dispositions is a necessary, and maybe sufficient, condition of being an evil person.
"wrong-intensifier." And this construction is itself open to (at least) two significantly different interpretations. On the one hand, it's taken to mean that the members of the set of things that are evil possess the very same properties as members of the set of things that are wrong, bad, disvalu able, etc., but they possess them to a degree which exceeds some (high) quantitative threshold. To intensify is often simply to increase: in this case, to increase the wrongness, badness, disvalue of that wrong thing. So, on this view, evil things are straightforwardly construed as very wrong ones. The wrongness of an assault increases with the extent of the injury intended and/or inflicted and, beyond a certain amount of injury, that assault becomes evil.
Alternatively, intensification can denote the addition of a qualitative difference. The wrong is intensified by the addition of some property that, in association with the wrong-making properties of the thing involved, renders it evil. This is a conception of intensification as aggravation.
In law, an assault is an "aggravated assault" if it's committed with intent to murder or with the aid of a dangerous weapon (and regardless of whether the injuries intended and/or inflicted are more extensive than those from assaults which lack these concomitant properties). The wrongness of your eating a sumptuous meal under the gaze of starving children is, we might think, aggravated by that food's having been confiscated from them.
Finally, it's a feature of virtually all conceptions of evil that they concur in attributing quantitative variability to evil itself. One evil act can be more evil than another. The familiar notion of "the lesser of two evils" is intelligible. Evil, in short, can (in principle) be calibrated. The aforesaid ground-clearing consists, then, partly in this. It seems to me that there is some non-negligible demand, reflected in ordinary usage, for a conception of evil possessing the following four properties: (i) that it is not simply synonymous with other terms of negative moral appraisal; (ii) that it applies independently to acts, without logically com mitting its users to the existence of any connection between the evilness of those acts and the evilness of either their perpetrators or their perpetra tors' dispositions or the states of affairs resulting from their perpetration; (iii) that it is a wrong-intensifier in the aggravating or qualitative sense,1 and (iv) that it admits of quantitative variability. I can't pretend that this conceptual demand, strong though it is, enjoys a monopoly license from ordinary usage: precisely that it doesn't has been the burden of the preceding paragraphs. Yet it seems indisputable that there is such a demand. And what I aim to do here is to explore the features of such a conception and, thence, their implications for assessing the extent to which evil acts are evil. definitive of supererogatory acts that they are "beyond duty": that is, they are not members of the set of act-types that are deontically obligatory.
Nor, of course, are they deontically forbidden. Should we therefore infer that, like acts of wearing red socks, they are morally permissible in the sense of morally indifferent? Do we really think that, morally speaking, it doesn't much matter whether, in some dire circumstance, I choose to act heroically or, instead, choose to wear red socks?
I'm going to take it that the judgement that this inference is utterly What is it, then, that could make the sumptuous eating an evil act and Carton's act a supererogatory one? It seems to me that there's no great mystery here: the notions of self-indulgence and, correspondingly, self sacrifice, spring readily to mind. The sumptuous eater, we may suppose, is deriving some pleasure from his wrong act, while Carton performs his very right act with complete awareness of its severe and painful cost to his personal well-being.
If this analysis is correct, the basis of nct symmetry appears to lie in the affective properties of evil and supererogatory acts. It's the affective interpretation of that symmetry, rather than merely the modal version, that gives us a conception of evil that satisfies our conditions (i) through (iii). By way of a conclusion, let me just say this. I do appreciate that those who have wrestled long and hard with the perplexing idea of evil may well find the foregoing analysis of it?particularly in regard to its calibra tion?somewhat shallow and mechanical. Evil is indeed a rich and complex concept and, as was noted near the outset, the conception of it presented here certainly holds no monopoly license from ordinary usage. Yet the challenge posed for those who do find this account unacceptable is to identify an alternative conception of evil's properties that nonetheless manages to satisfy conditions (i) through (iv) since these are, I think, rea sonably well-entrenched in at least part of that usage.
So the reason why she was only half-right in describing the act of eating that chocolate as "evil" is simply that, although it was undeniably pleasurable, it wasn't at all wrong.15
Hillel Steiner
University of Manchester NOTES 1. And, as a wrong-intensif?er, it can in principle pertain to any kind of wrong act and not solely interpersonal ones: wrongs to other persons are a subset of the set of wrong acts.
2. It's worth noting, at this point, that the history of moral philosophy reveals several highly influential meta-ethical positions that reject the very idea of supererogatory acts.
Kantian deontology and Benthamite consequentialism simply assimilate putatively supererogatory acts into the set of acts that are right or obligatory. The grounds for this rejection and assimilation will emerge presently. XCVI (1996), 231-44. 7 . I here put aside one complication that has no bearing on the present issue. The available options in a situation may all be instances of act-types that are deontically forbidden: When asked for my opinion of his work by an anxiously aspiring artist, I may have to act either dishonestly or unkindly. This possibility?of having to choose between two wrongs?arises even in situations where some of the available options have right making properties, since that fact in no way precludes all of them from also (as in the present case) having wrong-making properties. This is not, however, usually taken to signify that none of these options can be deontically obligatory and that the choice to be made by the person confronting them is, like a choice of socks, a morally unconstrained What if all that morality requires is, rather, that we satisfice, that the action we choose be one that is (merely) good enough! After all, isn't it true that "the best is often the enemy of the good"? Adequately addressing this complex issue here would, I fear, take me too far afield from the central focus of this essay. That said, it seems to me that the plau sibility of such a view strongly depends upon the reasons offered for choosing only a good-enough action, not being ones that themselves invoke moral considerations. These reasons standardly cite cost as the factor justifying sub-optimal choice. And that cost is usually associated with either (i) a delay in choosing due to the difficulty of identifying the optimal action, resulting in an even more sub-optimal outcome, or (ii) a serious compro mise of the chooser's interests. Of these, the first clearly is a moral consideration, signifying no more than that time-constraints, like many other types of constraint, strongly influence what counts as the morally optimal action: ought implies can. And the second suggests only that prudence is itself morally valuable: that regard for the chooser's interests is one amongst the several factors entering into the identification of the optimal action. In neither case are we driven to conclude that morality's requirements are satisfied by a sub-optimal action.
10. Pursuing this line of thought, a plausible suggestion is that the sets of evil and supererogatory acts can be enlarged by weakening the affective requirement for acts that are members of them. Thus an act is evil if (a) it is wrong, and (b) its doer does it either pleasurably or with affective indifference; correspondingly, an act is supererogatory if (a) it is right, and (b) its doer does it either painfully or with affective indifference. 11. The requirement of completeness in a normative system (see n. 7, above), though presupposing the presence of some such scale, is indeterminate with respect to the metrical properties of its modes of comparison. 12. And, appropriately conversely, rightness/pain for the measure of supererogatoriness.
13. Apparent counter-examples are the acts of joy-riders and computer hackers and, conversely, those of saints who enjoy the things they do for others. Isn't it thus mistaken to regard the former as being evil and the latter as not being supererogatory? My guess is that our disinclination to see joy-riders and hackers as evil is based on an impressionistic statistical judgement that the wrong they do is minor; that is, where we to have reason to revise that judgement upwards, the disinclination would, I conjecture, diminish. The saints objection is more troubling, though it does seem to presuppose what there is no reason to believe: namely that all the good acts of saints are supererogatory ones. In this regard, it's not irrelevant to note both that martyrdom is not a necessary condition of sanctity and that it is, ceteris paribus, a sufficient condition of it.
14. An obviously important question is whether this conception of evil is capable of sustaining the widely held view that the Holocaust is paradigmatically evil. I think the answer can be "yes. 
